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Regulation and the
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by Murray L. Weidenbaum
It is useful to examine government regula-

tion from the viewpoint of the American
consumer. Like anyone who has ever
breathed dirty air or smelled contaminated
water, I am concerned about what our business sector does to society. Of course, I am
equally concerned about pollution by
government and consumers, which often
can be as bad if not worse. But as a purchaser of goods and services, I also care a
great deal about what business firms do for
us as consumers. What is the central role of
the business system? Surely, it is to satisfy
consumer demands and to create jobs and
income by producing and selling goods and
services.
I find it fascinating that this basic function of the business firm is so completely
ignored by those who call themselves corporate activists. By the way, as a small
shareholder in some large firms, I bristle at
that self-designation. I usually find the activities of these people anti-corporate. In
any event, these activists deserve much of
the credit or blame for the largest and most
rapid increase in regulatory controls that
our nation has ever experienced. In the past
two decades, we have seen a proliferation
of government intervention in the private
sector, dwarfing the actions taken even in
the 1930s.

Dr. Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt
Distinguished University Professor at Washington
University in St. Louis.

A Hard Look at the Effects of Regulation
However, it is not the sheer number of
these regulatory activities that should concern us, but rather their impact on the
ability of the economic system to perform
its central function. If we look at the
modern regulatory phenomenon from the
viewpoint of the average firm, the nature of
the problem becomes apparent. For each
box on its organizational chart, there are
one or more government agencies that are
counterparts to that box, each of them
heavily involved in the company's internal
decision making. The impact is in one predictable direction: to increase the
company's overhead and operating costs,
and to reduce the resources available to
perform the company's major task of producing goods and services for the consumer. To the economist, this is the "opportunity cost" of government regulation; it
shows up in what I call the hidden tax of
regulation-the higher prices that we consumers pay to cover the cost of compliance
with regulation.

The basic function of the business firm
is ignored by those who call themselves
corporate activists
I have not yet mentioned the benefits of
regulation. To the extent that we have
cleaner air, cleaner water, and so forth,
these benefits are real. Please note that I
have chosen my words carefully. The mere
presence of a government agency does not
guarantee that its worthy objectives will be
achieved. The serious question-which I
will cover in a moment-is whether the
regulation produces benefits and whether
they are worth the costs. Society's bottom
line is not the impact of regulatory actions
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on the government or on the business system, but the effect on the consumer, on the
citizen.
Clearly, an important effect of regulation
is the increase in the price of goods and services. However, when we go beyond the dollar signs, more subtle and often far more
serious burdens emerge. Central among
these are the effects on research and
development, productivity, and capital formation-basic functions so often adversely
affected by regulation. Regulation has
reduced the flow of innovation, the production of new and better products, because so
many government regulatory agencies have
the power-which they frequently exercise-to decide whether or not a new product will go on the market.
The justification for this power is that it
keeps unsafe products off the market. Unfortunately, the reality is often different.
Consider drug regulation by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). If we look at
mortality data-rather than the rhetoricwe find that, for decades, the leading cause
of death in this country has not been cancer, but cardiovascular disease-heart attacks and strokes. There is a series of new
drugs for these illnesses called beta blockers. They are in widespread use in the

The mere presence of a government
agency will not guarantee that its
objectives will be achieved
United Kingdom and other developed nations. The United States, however, has
lagged in the introduction of these drugs
because of the antiquated procedures of the
FDA. According to the research of Professor
William Wardell at the University of
Rochester Medical School, one of these beta
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blockers, practolol, currently in widespread
use in Western Europe, would save 10,000
lives a year when introduced in the United
States.

Society's bottom line is the effect of
regulatory actions on the consumer
Beta blockers are not the only drugs
whose use has been delayed by the FDA. Dr.
Wardell has examined the list of drugs actually approved as safe and effective. In
case after case, the United States was one
of the last countries to permit their introduction. We are the twenty-second country in the case of the anti-inflammatory
drug fenoprofen, the thirty-ninth country
for the oral cephalosporin cephalexin, and
the fortieth country for the anti-tubercular
antibiotic capreomycin.
These delays are not surprising, given the
cardinal rule for bureaucratic survival: Do
not stick your neck out. If you were an FDA
reviewer and you were to approve practolol, you would be taking a risk. If anybody
should suffer any adverse reaction, you
may well bear the responsibility. On the
other hand, if you do not approve the drug,
the potential users are unlikely to complain, since they do not know about it and
they will soon pass from the scene. As a
result, you ask for more studies, you delay.

people die prematurely because approval of
a new drug has been delayed, the public is
unaware. Do not misunderstand my point:
it is a plea for balance and for effectiveness, not for the elimination of FDA
regulation. By the way, this is one example
among many where the real costs of regulation are not expressed in dollars but in
terms of lives.

The sad reality is that government
intervention often does not work-or it
works against the interest of the
consumer

Consider the results bluntly: if 16 people
are harmed by side-effects of a drug in use,
that becomes front page news. If 10,000

I do not believe that the issue before us is
as philosophical as, "Are you for or against
government intervention?" Rather, it involves a very practical question: "Does this
specific type of government intervention
work?" The sad reality is that, so often, it
does not-or it works against the interest
of the consumer. This reality has been
recognized in some areas. Deregulation of
the airlines has benefited the traveling
public as well as the airlines and their
employees. Deregulating trucking will do
the same.
But, on the other hand, in the case of environmental regulation, every economic
study I have ever seen has shown that there
is a different way of achieving at least the
same amount of clean air or clean water at
a small fraction of the current costs. That
other way involves working through the
price system by means of pollution taxes or
pollution permits or property rights. Economists are belatedly gaining support for that
position from some of the more enlightened
environmentalists. Unfortunately, business
generally takes an adamantly negative position. Perhaps many companies do not want
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Delays in drug approvals are not
surprising, given the cardinal rule for
bureaucratic survival:
Don't stick your neck out

regulation but, once they become regulated,
they become staunch advocates of the
status quo-preferring familiar inefficiency
to unfamiliar but more efficient regulation.
This leads me to a fundamental point
overlooked in so many discussions of regulation: we cannot assume that specific
regulations will necessarily produce any
consumer benefits at all. Take the example
of environmental regulation. One of the
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act was
written solely to protect the jobs of approximately 10,000 Midwestern mine workers.
Section 125-euphemistically titled
"Measures to Prevent Economic Disruption
or Unemployment" -gives the President the
power to prohibit major fuel-burning stationary sources from using any fuel other
than local or regionally available coal, "to
prevent or minimize significant local or
regional economic disruption or unemployment." Once the Governor of any state has
obtained the President's consent under Section 125, he can even require coal-burning
utilities to enter into long-term contracts
(ten years or more) for supplies of local
coal. The governor of Ohio requested authority to require the use of local coal in his
state some four years ago, but his request
has never been acted upon. Nonetheless, the
Clean Air Act could potentially be used to
mandate dirtier air for millions of citizens
in order to protect less than 10,000 people
from competiton.

Another 1977 amendment to the Clean Air
Act shows why government regulatory
statutes rarely conform to the spirit of
"truth-in-labeling." The BACT (best available control technology) requirement, which
applies to all new sources of potentially
significant pollution, is a cogent case. The
effect of this provision is to force all new
coal-fueled power plants to use scrubbers-even if the air would be cleaner if
they did not. How does this ridiculous
result come about? Simple: the focus in the
statute is not on achieving clean air. Rather,
it is on imposing the onerous requirements
of scrubbing "coal," whether high or low in
sulphur. The results are ironic: Since utilities are required to use the scrubbers anyway, it is often cheaper to use high-sulphur
(high polluting) coal because it costs less. It
is sad to note that the air in many regions
would be cleaner if the utilities were given
a choice between (a) cheap and dirty coal
plus scrubbers, and (b) expensive and
cleaner coal without scrubbers. The cynical
explanation is the correct one: the motive in
this environmental statute is to encourage
the use of high-sulphur coal.
The tendency for the regula tory process
to be used by small groups to extract
benefits from society as a whole is not a recent phenomenon. Peter Aranson of Emory
University has brought to my attention the
following quotation:

Government intervention is a very
powerful but extremely imperfect tool.
We must use it carefully, with full
awareness of all side effects.

Every new regulation ... presents a
new harvest to those who watch the
change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the
great body of their fellow citizens. This
is a state of things in which it may be
said with some truth that the laws are
made for the few, not for the many.

6

7

That quotation is taken from the Federalist
Papers, No. 62, by James Madison.
All this demonstrates that government intervention is a very powerful but extremely
imperfect tool. We must use it carefully,
with full awareness of all side effects. Certainly, there are problems in society, and
some regulatory activities do generate
benefits. The serious concern is to balance
the benefits against the costs and side effects of regulatory actions. The result, we
must hope, will identify the most efficient
way of meeting society's goals-and, thus,
also help to maintain support for them.

I have never met a mortal man or
woman who truly represented the
public interest

The Role of Benefit/Cost Analysis
This important aspect leads me to a second point, the role of benefit/cost analysis
in regulation. Let us remember that benefit/cost analysis has been used for decades
in examining government spending programs. It is neither a revolutionary, new
idea nor an invention of the far right. It has
been attacked by both ends of the political
spectrum-by the far left because not every
proposal for government intervention
passes a benefit/cost test, and by the far
right, who oppose it because benefit/cost
analysis can be used to justify government
intervention. No analytical approach is
totally value free, but I suggest that
benefit/cost analysis has less ideological
baggage than most alternatives.

The simple-minded approach to
reconciling legitimate, competing
concerns is to automatically label one
set of interests "public interests, which
are supposedly good, and label the
other set "special or business interests,
which are presumably bad

At this point, let me issue a disclaimer. I
do not claim to represent the public interest. I have spent many years in government,
helping to make public policy. I have never
met a mortal man or woman who truly represented the public interest. Good government policy, if we ever get it, reconciles a
variety of bona fide, legitimate interests. Is
clean air a legitimate interest? Of course. Is
high employment legitimate? Is bringing
down inflation legitimate? Is producing
safer products legitimate? The answer to
each of these questions is yes. They are all
important interests. However, we need a
mechanism for balancing them-rather
than taking the simple-minded approach of
automatically labeling one set of interests
"public interests," which are supposedly
good, and labeling the other set "special or
business interests," which are presumably
bad.

The motive for incorporating such analysis into public-sector decision making is to
lead to more efficient use of government resources by subjecting the public sector to
the same type of quantitative constraints as
those in the private sector. In making an investment decision, for example, business
executives compare costs with expected revenues. If the costs exceed the revenues, the
investment is not considered worthwhile.
The government decision maker, however,
does not face the same economic constraints. If the costs to society of an agency
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action exceed the benefits, that situation
does not usually have an adverse impact on
the agency. In fact, the administrators may
not even know about it. The aim of requiring agencies to perform benefit/cost
analysis is to make the government's decision making process more effective. It also
helps to counterbalance the strong attraction toward regulatory activity on the part
of government agencies and their supporters, who can crow about the benefits
and ignore the costs-because the costs are
transmitted to the consumer not by the
government but by business. In fact,
regulatory activists can have some fun
needling business about price increases
even when they result from the costs of
complying with regulation.

Applying Analysis to Regulation
Let us analyze benefit-cost analysis. A
basic relationship of costs and benefits
tends to hold for many regulatory programs. Typically, the initial regulatory effort-such as cleaning up the worst effects
of pollution in a river-may generate benefits significantly greater than costs. But the
resources required to achieve additional
cleanup become disproportionately high. At
some point the added benefits are substantially less than the added costs. There are
many examples. A study of environmental
controls on the fruit and vegetable processing industry shows that it costs less to
eliminate the first 85 percent of the pollution than the next 10 percent. 1
Likewise, the pulp and paper industry
spent $3 billion complying with federal
clean-water standards, and achieved a 95
percent reduction in pollution. But to reach
98 percent would cost $4.8 billion more, a
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160 percent increase in costs to achieve a 3
percent increase in benefits. 2
Benefit/cost analysis is viewed as a tool
for identifying the optimum amount of
regulation. To an economist, "overregulation" is not an emotional term; it is merely
shorthand for regulation for which the
costs to the public are greater than the
benefits.

"Overregulation" is not an emotional
term; it is shorthand for regulation for
which the costs to the public are
greater than the benefits
In addition, when there is more than one
way of attaining a regulatory goal, benefit/cost analysis can compare the various
methods and help select the most attractive.
Please note, I did not say that benefit/cost
analysis will select the least expensive alternative. Rather, it will identify the most efficient one in meeting regulatory goals.
Sometimes the indirect effects of regulation are as important as the direct. Consider the question of mandatory standards
to ensure the production of less hazardous
consumer products. From time to time, suggestions have been made to require more
protection in football helmets. Those using
the safer helmets would be expected to receive the benefit from fewer injuries. But in
practice, the standards might well contribute to more injuries, since the price
increases to cover the new regulatory requirements might result in more people
playing football without any protective
equipment at all. That example illustrates
another basic thrust of benefit/cost
analysis-to examine the proposed government action not from the viewpoint of
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business or government but from the vantage point of the consumer.
When it is not feasible to put a dollar
sign on the benefits, the analytical approach still can help by ranking the costeffectiveness of alternatives. In essence, the
analysis estimates the costs of different
ways to accomplish the same objective.

Critics who are offended by the notion
of subjecting a regulation to a
benefit/cost test must fear that their pet
rules would flunk the test
These studies help policymakers to identify
least-cost solutions. This approach can be
particularly useful in programs to reduce
personal hazards. Instead of dealing with
such an imponderable question as the cost
of a human life, the emphasis shifts to identifying the regulatory approach that maximizes the number of lives saved from use
of available resources.
Uses and Limitations of
Benefit/Cost Analysis
Reliable measures of costs and benefits
are not easily achieved. However, the difficulties involved need not deter the pursuit
of analysis. Merely identifying important
and overlooked impacts can be useful. Examples on the cost side include the beneficial drugs not available because of regulatory obstacles, the freight not carried
because empty trucks are not permitted to
carry backhauls, investment in new plants
not made due to more stringent environmental requirements for new sources, and
the television and radio stations not broadcasting because they are not licensed. On
the benefit side, examples include a more
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productive work force that results from
fewer accidents on the job, reduced illness
because of safer products, and a healthier
environment resulting from compliance
with governmental regulations.

The painful knowledge that resources
available to safeguard human lives are
limited causes economists to become
concerned when they see wasteful use
of those resources because of regulation
Critics who are offended by the notion of
subjecting regulation to a benefit/cost test
unwittingly expose the weakness of their
position. They must fear that their pet rules
would flunk the test. After all, showing that
a regulatory activity generates an excess of
benefits is a strong justification for continuing it. Benefit/cost analysis is a neutral concept, giving equal weight to a dollar of
benefits and to a dollar of costs. The painful knowledge that resources available to
safeguard human lives are limited causes
economists to become concerned when they
see wasteful use of those resources because
of regulation.
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A Personal Note
I have tried to provide serious, although
spirited respo11Ses to those who criticize the
efforts of ec0110mists to examine, a11d to
quantify, the costs of regulation. I find many
arguments by certain members of the legal
profession more in the nature of debaters'
points rather than serious responses. For example, much is made of the point that the
cost estimates are gross a11d that the benefits
have not been deducted. This may have a
plausible ring initially, until we reflect on
the world around us. When my wife reports
angrily that the price of bread has risen to
$1.50 a loaf, do I cavalierly dismiss her concern by telling her she has forgotten to
deduct the benefits? Implicitly, we assume
that the value to us of the bread we buy is
at least $1.50 a loaf. Similarly, I pay a considerable amount of taxes to the government. I hope that the benefits justify those
payments. But I know of no taxpayer who
refers to his or her tax burden on an afterbenefit basis. I see no reason to ignore or
minimize the information on the costs imposed by government on the public. Indeed,
I find it intriguing that economists can
write whole books on the benefits of regulation without generating the slightest
criticism. But try writing a report on the
costs, and you literally take your professional life in your hands, although I prefer
to feel that you are belling the cat.
A final note of irony concerns the histrionics that I have observed from time to time
when a lawyer comments on attempts by an
economist to estimate the hypothetical value
of human life for purposes of regulatory
analysis. The irony arises when we consider
the frequency with which members of the
legal profession place a very specific value
on an individual human life. But they do
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that typically in a courtroom when a
generous retainer or contingency fee is at
stake. At least we can come to understand
the high principle involved.
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